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Notes on the Tax Treatment of Structures
ABSTRACT
More than three quarters of the United States tangible capital stock repre-
sents structures. Tax policies potentially have a major impact on both the
level and composition of investment in structures and equipment. This point is
explicitly recognized in most discussions of the effects of capital income
taxation. Two aspects of the taxation of structures --therelative burden
placed on structures as opposed to equipment investment and the non-taxation of
owner occupied housing under the income tax --haveattracted substantial atten-
tion in recent years. This paper explores these two aspects of the taxation of
structures investments.
While the tax system may well have a potent impact on the level and com-
position of structures investment, this paper argues that conventional analyses
of these effects are very misleading. We reach two main conclusions. First,
under current tax law, certain types of structures investment are very highly
tax favored. Structures can be transferred and therefore depreciated more than
once, and structures may be readily financed with tax-favored debt. Overall, it
is unlikely that a significant bias towards equipment and against structures
exists under current law. Second, the conventional view that the tax system is
biased in favor of homeownership is wrong. Because of the possibility of "tax
arbitrage" between high bracket landlords and low bracket tenants, the tax
system has long favored rental over ownership for most households. The 1981
reforms by reducing the top marginal tax rate reduced this bias somewhat.
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(313) 764—6769 (617) 495—2144 (617) 495-2447More than three quarters of the United States tangible capital stock
represents structures. Despite their relatively low rates of depreciation,
structures account for more than half of all gross fixed investment in most
years. Tax policies potentially have a major impact on both the level and
composition of investment in structures. This point is explicitly recognized
in most discussions of the effects of capital income taxation. Two aspects of
the taxation of structures --therelative burden placed on structures as
opposed to equipment investment and the non-taxation of owner occupied housing
under the income tax --haveattracted substantial attention in recent years.
This paper explores these two aspects of the taxation of structures invest—
ments.
The Treasury1984) in its recent tax reform proposal, pointed to the
extra tax burdens placed on structures relative to equipment as a major defect
of the current ACRS system.The 1985 Economic Report of the President echoes
this sentiment, concludthg that, The effective tax rate...islower for equip-
ment than for structures. Because different industries utilize different
mixes of capital goods, differential taxation of assets results in differen-
tial taxation of capital income by industry. The average effective Federal
corporate tax rate on fixed investment varies widely by industry." The deci-
sions of the Congress in 1984 and 1985 to scale back the depreciation benefits
to structures but not to equipment is perhaps surprising in light of these
conclusions.
The allegedly favorable treatment of owner occupied housing has long been—2-
a target of academic critics of the tax system although suggestions for reform
have generated little if any political support. The failure to include
imputed rent is often treated as a tax subsidy. A large literature summarized
in Rosen (1985) has estimated the welfare loss thought to come from tax
induced changes in tenure choice. And the corporate income tax is often
opposed on the ground that it exacerbates the distortions caused by the non-
taxation of owner occupied housing.
While the tax system may well have a potent impact on the level and
composition of the structures investment, this paper argues that conventional
analyses of these effects are very misleading. We reach two main conclusions.
First, under current tax law, certain types of structures investment arevery
highly tax favored. Overall, it is unlikely that a significant bias towards
equipment and against structures exists under current law. Second, the
conventional view that the tax system is biased in favor of homeownership is
wrong. Because of the possibility of "tax arbitrage" between high bracket
landlords and low bracket tenants, the tax system has long favored rentalover
ownership for most households. The 1981 reforms by reducing the top marginal
tax rate reduced this bias somewhat.
Many earlier analyses have reached different conclusions because of their
failure to take account of several aspects of the behavior of real world
investors which serve to reduce the effective tax burden on structures
investment. First, structures may be depreciated more than once ("churned")
for tax purposes. Particularly where devices can be found to reduce the
effective rate of capital gains tax below the statutory rate, the effective
purchase price of a structure may he reduced substantially by the knowledge—3—
that it can be depreciated several times. Second,some types of structures,
particularly commercial buildings, are very easy to borrowagainst because
they are quite liquid assets. To the extent that the taxsystem favors the
use of debt finance they too will be favored. Third, certaintypes of invest-
ments, especially residential rental capital, facilitate taxarbitrage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviewstrends in
structures investment over the past fewyears and highlights the dramatic
increase in the rate of investment in commercialbuildings that has occurred
in recent years. Some information on theownership of different types of
structures investments is also presented. Section II describesthe tax rules
governing the churning of capital assets and considers under what
circumstances the churning of assets will be taxadvantaged. Section III con-
siders the role of leverage and raises thepossibility that structures invest-
ments are favored under current tax law because of theirability to carry
debt. Section IV examines the tax advantages tohomeownership and shows that
the tax law actually provides incentives for most householdsto rent their
homes. Section V concludes the paper by discussing theimplications of our
results for tax reform and future research.—4-.
I. PATTERNS OF STRUCTURES OWNERSHIP AND INVESTMENT
A number of studies, notably Auerbach (1983) and Fullerton and Henderson
(1984), have made rather elaborate calculations of the deadweight losses
arising from the failure of the tax system to impose equal burdens on
different types of corporate investment. In large part it is the assumed
differential taxation of equipment and structures that drive the results of
these studies. This differential taxation creates production inefficiencies
within industries, and also favors some industries at the expense of others.
Despite the results of many academic experts and the results of staff analyses
suggesting that the then current law was heavily biased in favor of equipment,
the Congress in 1984 chose to scale back the depreciation benefits associated
with structures investments while not altering the tax treatment of equipment
investments. Tax legislation in 1982 had reduced somewhat the value of depre-
ciation allowances for equipment, but standard calculations still showed
equipment to be strongly tax favored over structures. The 1984 action was
taken at least in part because of a widespread perception that the 1981 acce-
leration of depreciation allowances had led to the rapid growth of tax
shelters based on investments -in structures. Additional tax law changes in
1984 and 1985 further reduced the value of depreciation allowances for struc-
tures while leaving equipment allowances intact.
How can one square the perception that structures are a common tax
shelter vehicle with calculations suggesting that they are among the most
heavily taxed assets? Part of the answer may be found in Table 1 which
examines the composition of the stock of structures in 1983 the most recent-5—
year for which data are available. The first row of the table shows that
corporate structures represented less than a quarter of all structures in 1983
and that they accounted for less than half of all depreciable structures.
While detailed data are not available on the ownership of different types
of structures, it -is clear from the data in the table that the vast majority
of residential capital represents owner occupied housing with the bulk of the
remaining residential capital representing partnerships and proprietorships.
Only a negligible fraction of residential capital is held in corporate form.
The ownership of non-residential structures is more complex. It appears
likely to us that most of the non-corporate structures are commercial
buildings owned by partnerships or proprietors. The other main categories of
nonresidential structures --industrialbuildings, mines and public utility
structures --areprobably largely owned by corporations.
Patterns of Structures Investment
Table 2 presents some information on the composition of structures
investment in 1980 before the introduction of ACRS and in 1985. The
Table highlights a number of aspects of structures investment that seem
critical in assessing neutrality arguments suggesting a tax bias against
structures investment. First, a substantial share of structures investment
takes place in forms where the effects of taxes cannot sensibly be analyzed in
isolation. In 1985, for example public utilities accounted for about
20 percent of all investment in structures. The profit rate of most public
utilities is regulated and in many cases the benefits associated with tax
incentives, especially the investment tax credit, are passed on to consumers.-6—
Public utility firms may have objectives more complicated than simple
unconstrained profit maximization. About 40 percent of structures investment
takes place in forms where other public microeconom-ic policies are intimately
involved in guiding the allocation of resources educational and hospital
buildings, mining and petroleum, and farming. As with public utilities
examining the effects of tax benefits in isolation is likely to be very
misleading. The remaining 40 percent of structures investment takes place in
industrial and commercial buildings where tax considerations are presumably of
primary importance. What is perhaps surprising is that industrial buildings
(plants) represent only about 10 percent of all non-residential structures
investment. Commercial buildings account for the remaining 30 percent of non-
residential structures investment.
Second, the information in the table indicates that there has been a
fairly dramatic shift in non—residential structures investment towards
commercial buildings and in particular office buildings over the last five
years. The dollar volume of investment in commercial buildings more than
doubled between 1980 and 1985 compared to an increase of less than 50 percent
in overall structures investment.The industrial buildings category has been
particularly weak over the same period, so commercial building investment is
now four times as great as industrial buildings investment compared with a
ratio of two to one in 1980. It is perhaps ironic that the 1981 tax cut which
had as a major objective spurring corporate investment has been followed by a
dramatic spurt in commercial buildings investment ---alarge part of which
occurs outside the corporate sector. Between 1980 and 1985, real investment
in commercial structures increased by 56 percent, of which office building—7-.
investment rose 85, compared to a 22 percent increase in overallnonresiden-
tial construction and a 26 percent increase in equipment investment.As we
discuss in detail below the dramatic divergence betweenpatterns of investment
in commercial buildings and other structures raises thesuspicion that despite
their identical depreciation schedules the taxsystem affects them very dif-
ferently.
We resist the temptation to analyze closely the evolution of investment
in different types of assets over the last fewyears because of the problem
stressed by Auerbach and Hines (1986) among others ofgauging the effects of
anticipated changes in tax policy. In 1984 and 1985 the depreciation
incentives for investment -in structures were reduced. Inaddition, rules
limiting investors' ability to utilize structures investments as tax shelters
were introduced. More changes in the same direction are currently under
discussion. It is a least conceivable that some of thestrength in commercial
buildings investment, and perhaps other types of investment as well,comes from
a desire to accelerate investments so that they will receive favorabletax
treatment. Given the common political view that real estate investmentsare a
major tax shelter vehicle, it is possible that these effects are most
important in the case of commercial buildings.
Table 2 also indicates that residential investment has beensurprisingly
strong over the last five years. The dollar volume of residential investment
has increased by more than 50 percent over thepast 5 years, and real invest-
ment in residential structures has increased by 26percent, the same rate of
growth exhibited by equipment investment. Virtually all of the realgrowth in
residential investment is attributable to owner-occupiedhousing, which has-8-
risen 57% despite the fact that alone among structures it received no new tax
incentives in 1981. Hendershott (1986) provides some evidence suggesting that
at the same time that residential investment has been strong the homeownership
rate has increased substantially.
The patterns of structures investment documented in this sectionsuggest
that conventional analyses of the effects of taxation may be seriously
misleading. Such analyses do not distinguish between tax effects on different
types of nonresidential structures and so cannot account for the great
strength of commercial buildings investment relative to other types of struc-
tures investment. Many conventional analyses emphasize an alleged tax bias
towards owner occupied housing. These analyses cannot account for the obser-
vation that owner occupied housing investment rose more rapidly than that of
any other category following the 1981 tax change which conferred substantial
depreciation benefits on rental housing. These apparent anomaliesmay just
reflect non-tax factors which exert a substantial influence on investment.
Alternatively, it is possible that important aspects of the effects of the tax
system on structures have been neglected. We consider the latter possibility
below.II. TAX CHURNING OF NONRESIDENTIAL REAL PROPERTY
As -is now well understood, the present value of the depreciation
allowances permitted on a capital asset has an important impact on the
incentive to invest in it.Indeed, differences in the treatment of
depreciation between assets is often regarded as a major source of
non-neutrality in the tax system. Unfortunately, calculation of the present
value of the depreciation allowances on a given capital asset is not
straightforward because of the possibility of the assets being transferred and
depreciated more than once for tax purposes. Particularly in an inflationary
environment, there may be large advantages to turning assets over so their
depreciable basis will be increased. Even with no inflation, asset sales
raise the value of prospective depreciation allowances as long as depreciation
allowances are more accelerated than economic depreciation. However, the
incentive to churn assets is mitigated by the capital gains taxes and
"recapture" taxes which must be paid when depreciable assets are sold.
This section examines the effects on investment incentives of the
possibility that assets can be depreciated more than once,1 After a review of
the legal treatment of depreciation allowances and recapture, we analyze the
desirability of churning different classes of assets. We find that the
incentive to churn and the related incentive to invest is rather sensitive to
both tax rates and assumed discount rates.
Depreciation and Recapture Rules
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 established shorter and faster
write-offs of capital costs for new investment 'inequipmentand structures.-10-
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) included a provision for
depreciation of most classes of structures by a 175 declining balance method
over 15 years. ACRS replaced the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) system, which
was by comparison far less generous in its treatment of capital depreciation
allowances.
The ACRS significantly reduced corporations' costs of investing in
structures and equipment. Other than the named goal of Economic Recovery, one
of the purposes of the law was to rectify the effect of then—rising inflation
on incentives to invest. Since the favorable depreciation provisions were
designed to undo by themselves the effects of inflation, the law contained
features which made it more costly than before to sell assets in order to per—
mit the purchaser to get depreciation allowances on the higher, inflated
basis.
The 1981 tax law permits investors to choose from a variety of options
for depreciating most classes of real property. Besides using 1759 declining
balance with switch-over to straight—line over an asset life of 15 years,
investors could select a straight-line depreciation method for an asset life
o-f 15, 35, or 45 years as they chose. Under normal business circumstances,
of course, an investor who planned never to sell his assets would always
choose the shortest and most accelerated depreciation method.2 However, the
recapture provisions of the law depend on the chosen method of asset
depreciation.
For investors who choose straight—line depreciation and who sell their
assets, the difference between the sales price and the tax basis is treated as
a capital gain and is taxed at the capital gain rate. However, for investors—11—
in nonresidential structures who choose the 175?6 declining balance depre-
ciation scheme and who sell their assets at a gain, the value of all depre-
ciation allowances taken to date are recaptured as ordinary income (rather
than as capital gains). This recapture of all past depreciation deductions is
normally sufficiently costly that an investor would be better off using
straight—line depreciation if he intended to sell the asset at any point.
Congress has modified the tax treatment of structures since passage of
the 1981 act, although not substantially. The 1984 Deficit Reduction Act
(DEFRA) lengthened the tax lives of most structures to 18 years and changed
slightly the tax treatment of installment sales. Structures tax lives were
further extended to 19 years in 1985. Depreciation and recapture provisions
were otherwise unaffected by these laws.3
Evaluating the Incentive to Churn
The feasibility of churning an asset depends on its characteristics. A
specialized industrial structure is likely to be difficult to sell because its
functional specificity limits the range of potential buyers. And it may be
difficult to sell and lease back because of the moral hazard and other
problems associated with rental contracts. Most commercial real estate, on the
other hand, is not highly specialized and is therefore easily leased. Indeed
Pan Am rents space in the Pan Am building and Exxon rents its space in
Rockefeller Center. A natural conjecture then is that if the tax benefits to
churning are substantial, a significant tax distortion may be created in favor
of liquid assets. We explore this possibility by considering the magnitude of—12--
the tax incentive for the churning of commercial buildings.
Consider an investor, corporate or noncorporate, which invests in acom-
mercial building in 1985, expecting the tax law, inflation, and the interest
rate not to change in the future. There are three possible depreciation stra-
tegies that must be considered. First, the investor can use accelerated
depreciation (with straight—line switch-over) and never churn the asset.
Second, the investor can use accelerated depreciation and churn at the optimal
point. Third, the firm can use straight—line depreciation and churn at the
optimal point. We consider the attractiveness of each of these alternatives
in turn.
Depreciation allowances can be easily calculated for scenarios in which
firms do not churn their assets. For the current 19-year tax lifetime, it is
optimal for firms to use 175% declining balance for the first 10 years of asset
lives, switching to straight-line depreciation thereafter. The value to the





where D9(j) is the depreciation allowance inthe jthyear using ACRS accelera-
tion and I is the required nominal before-tax rate of return.4 HereT-isthe
investor's ordinary tax rate, so equals 46% for a corporation and can beas
high as 50% for an individual.
If instead the firm chooses the second option of depreciating its struc-
ture using the straight-line method and selling the asset after kyears, then
the present value of the firm's depreciation allowances minus capitalgains
liability is:—13—
k
k (2.2) NET(k) =TD(j)[l+i(1-T)J3-CG{Q(k) [i-D(j)J}[1+i(lT)}k j=1 j=1
where D5(j) is the straight-linedepreciation allowance in the jthyear and
Q(k) is the market value of the asset afterk years. In this case,
=1/19for all j. CC in (2.2) is thecapital gains rate, which normally
equals 28% for a corporation, and is atmost 20% for an individual. With the
further assumption that structuresdepreciate exponentially at an annualrate
5, Q(k) simplifies to:
(2.3) Q(k) =[(l_o)(l+lr)Jk
where ir is the inflation rate. Tocalculate the tax benefits fromchurning,
assume that k represents the optimal choice ofwaiting time between asset
purchase and sale. Then the second—roundoptimal tax treatment of the used
asset will also include churning after kmore years. Assume for simplicity
that the firm sells the asset to itselfat a market price, incurring a tran—
saction cost in the process. Then thepresent value of all net depreciation
benefits minus costs iS:
(2.4) PV = {NET (k) -IC•Q(k)[1+i(l-T)J
j =0
where IC is the fraction of salesprice the firm pays as a transaction cost.
This expression simplifies to:
(2.5) PV ={NET(k) -IC•Q(k)[1+i(1-T))l/{i-
Thethird option the firm faces is somewhatmore complicated. Assuming
that the rate of inflation exceeds the
asset's exponential depreciation rate,—14-
so that the seller realizes a capital gain over purchase price, net
depreciation benefits after churning in the kth year are:
k






The potential tax benefits of churning are sensitive to the choice of
capital gains tax rate. Previous calculations of the tax effects of asset
sales have assumed that capital gains are all taxed upon realization at the
statutory rate. Particularly for individuals but to some extent for
corporations as well there are devices available which permit capital gains
taxes to be avoided or deferred. This makes the churning of assets much more
attractive. The features of the tax system that permit capital gains taxes to
be avoided or reduced in present value include installment sales, variations
in marginal tax rates, artificially generated losses, steps up in basis, and
outright cheating.
The main device that both corporations and individuals can both use to
defer capital gains taxes is the installment sale. Rules governing
installment sales were actually liberalized in 1980 but have been tightened
more recently.5 In an installment sale the seller accepts a sequence of
installment payments for his property. The buyer is permitted to use the
present value of these payments, the sale price, as his depreciation basis.
However the seller must pay capital gains tax on the principal component of
installment payments only as they are received. The net effect is to defer
the seller's capital gains tax liability. The advantage can be quite substan-—15—
tial since at current interest rates deferral for sevenyears halves a tax
liability. The advantage is magnified if for some reason the seller's tax
rate is expected to decline. While the installment sale is acommonly
discussed tax avoidance device, we are not aware of quantitative information
on the frequency of its use.
For individuals with temporarily low income or corporations withnegative
or very small taxable profits, progressivity of the tax code makes the effec-
tive marginal capital gains tax rate lower than its normal(statutory) value.
Since taxpayers have some freedom to realize capital gainsduring advantageous
(low tax rate) years, there is an option value attached to an anticipated
future capital gains liability that reduces the effective rate. The results
of Auerbach and Poterba (1986) suggest that thismay be more important for
individuals than corporations.
The possibilities for avoiding capital gains taxes are broadened
considerably when the possibility of generating artificial losses is
recognized. Stiglitz (1983) among others has discussed a variety of "tax
timing" strategies through which taxpayers can generate capital losses without
taking on substantial risks.6 The law limits the abilities of individuals and
corporations to deduct capital losses against ordinary income. To the extent
that these limits bind, the marginal tax rate on additional capitalgains
income is zero. Poterba (1985) presents evidence suggesting that about 20
percent of household dividends were received by tax payers for whom marginal
capital gains were untaxed because they were in this situation. It seems
plausible that the fraction is higher for the sophisticated investors who hold
commercial real estate.—16—
The tax code provides for a tax free step up in the basis on an asset if
the taxpayers dies and bequeaths the asset or if the asset is given to
charity. To the extent that taxpayers anticipate that they may die over the
period -in which they plan to hold an asset the expected tax rate is reduced.
The step up of basis on some kinds of charitable gifts means that individuals
who plan to donate to charity an amount greater than their capital gains
income can avoid capital gains taxes entirely. These two provisions mean that
even naive and honest taxpayers can avoid capital gains tax burdens.
Finally there is the possibility of failing to report capital gains.
Overall, Poterba estimates that about 40 percent of capital gains are not
reported. This figure refers to capital gains on all types of assets.
Unfortunately, separate figures are not available for real estate.7
The combination of these factors suggests that capital gains arising when
structures investments are churned are effectively taxed at much less than the
statutory rate. We therefore consider also the incentives for churning that
arise when individuals' capital gains are completely untaxed and when they are
taxed at half the statutory rate, as well as corporations' incentives when
their capital gains are taxed at half and three-quarters the statutory rate.
Results
Table 3 reports values of net before-tax corporate depreciation
allowances and effective tax rates for representative parameter values. These
calculations employ the 2.479 annual exponential depreciation rate Hulten and
Wykoff (1981) report for commercial structures, and assume that transactions
cost when assets are sold equal 5? of the sales price. The table presents—17—
results with required rates of returnof 296 and 496. As Summers (1986)
argues, these rates are if anything higher than those
suggested by theory but
are rather lower than those actually used
by corporations. The 4% figure is
standard in the effective tax rate literature.
For the churning scenarios it isassumed that the firm chooses the
depreciation method and interval betweenasset sales so as to maximize
profits. As this table makes clear, undercurrent law corporations will
seldom want to churn structures fortax reasons. This is hardlysurprising,
since the recapture provisions of thetax law were designed to prevent such
transactions. If the marginal corporate investorfaces less than the
statutory capital gains rate, then itmay become slightly preferrable to churn
its structures.
Table 4 presents similar calculations fortop-bracket individuals who
invest in structures through such devicesas partnerships or proprietorships.
As the table suggests, individuals havemuch stronger incentives to churn
structures than do corporations. Thetop individual tax rate for ordinary
income is 50%, and the top capitalgains rate is 20%. Even ignoring the
likely ability of individuals to avoid more of theircapital gains liability
than corporations can theirs, the 30%spread between the ordinary income and
statutory capital gains rate is a much strongerchurning incentive than the
1896 spread faced by corporations.
At a 3% rate of inflation and 2%required rate of return individuals
always choose to churn their assets, and -ifthey can avoid capital
gains taxes, may face negative effective taxrates. Even at higher inflation
rates churning is a tax—preferredactivity for individuals. Whether at a—18
particular inflation rate corporations or individuals face higher effective
tax rates may depend on their marginal capital gains rates. The source of
funds matters as well, since the double taxation of corporate earnings may
make the required corporate rate of return for new savings capital
substantially higher than the rate for, say, partnership investors. Section
III treats this issue in more depth, but it is sufficient at this point to note
that individuals may face strong incentives to invest in structures and sell
them later.8 In particular, these results suggest that the tax code favors
individual rather than corporate ownership of structures.
The preceding analysis is subject to two qualifications. Our calcula-
tions understate the potential importance of the resale of assets because they
ignore the option value associated with uncertainty in asset values. If an
asset appreciates rapidly, there will be tax advantages to turning it over.
For a careful treatment of tax churning -inamodel where depreciation -is
stochastic, see Williams (1981). He finds that introducing uncertainty signi-
ficantly increases the effect of the churning on the effective purchase price
of new capital goods. For example, parameter values which most closely
approximate the current tax treatment of structures produce the result that
doubling the variance of future asset prices raises the expected present value
of depreciation allowances by about 15. Uncertainty in the tax law and the
possibility of favorable future tax law changes may contribute to this effect.
The second qualification is that our results may overstate the gains from
churning by ignoring the capital gains taxes which often must be paid on land
sales that accompany the transfer of structures. It is not clear to what
degree these two qualifications are offsetting.—19—
The Extent of Churning
The limited available empirical evidence suggests that churning is an
important part of the depreciation strategy for investors in structures.
Table 5 presents data on the depreciation methods chosen by corporations and
partnerships for their structures investments in 1981 and 1982. Corporations
used straight-line depreciation for 38 of the value of their structures
investments in 1981 and for 33% in 1982. Except in very unusual circumstan-
ces, use of straight-line depreciation makes sense only when firms plan to
sell their assets at some date. In addition, under the generous pre-1984
recapture rules for installment sales, some firms may have used accelerated
depreciation even if they wanted to churn their assets later. By such exten-
sive use of straight-line depreciation, the corporate sector givesup the
substantial tax benefits of acceleration in order, presumably, to avoid costly
recapture when the structures are sold later.9
The bottom panel of Table 5 presents far more striking information on
partnerships. Fully 60% of the value of strucures put in place by part-
nerships since the introduction of ACRS was depreciated straight-line. This
is, of course, quite consistent with our findings that churning can bevery
attractive for individual investors and that individuals are more likely than
corporations to take advantage of churning possibilities. The 60% figure in
Table 5 is likely to understate the extent of straight—line use for nonresi-
dential investment, since the entry includes residential investment other than
low—income housing. The absence of a special recapture penalty makes itvery
likely that partnerships use accelerated depreciation for their residential
investments, so the fraction of nonresidential structures depreciated-20-
straight-line is probably above 6O. While the data on partnership and cor-
porate depreciation methods are preliminary and subject to reporting error, it
seems clear that they support the hypothesis that investors often plan to sell
their assets. At the very least, this information casts doubt on the relevance
of standard effective tax rate calculations that assume all investors to use
accelerated depreciation methods.
The results in this section suggest that taking account of the
possibility of tax churning may help to explain the recent boom in commercial
building. If individuals use low discount rates and can avoid capital gains
taxes, the tax burden on commercial structures may now be small or even
negative. This reflects both the 1981 tax reforms and the reduction in
inflation since 1980. It probably represents a substantial reduction in the
tax burden from the situation that prevailed prior to 1981.
III. CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY AND THE EFFECTIVE
TAX RATES ON STRUCTURES INVESTMENT
Our analysis so far has concerned features of the tax treatment of
investments in structures which are common to individual investors, part-
nerships, and corporations. The current conventional wisdom that current tax
law favors equipment over structures is derived from studies which have
focused on corporate investment rather than overall investment.10 The calcula-
tions underlying these claims are almost always based on a variant of the for-
mula for the user cost of capital derived by Hall and Jorgenson (1967). This
formula, however, ignores a variety of factors, among them personal taxes and
corporate financial policy. In this section, we argue that when the effects—21—
of personal taxes and corporate financial policyare taken into account, there
is a much smaller difference between the calculated effectivetax rates on
structures and equipment, and perhaps even a tax advantage to investmentsin
structures.
The intuitive point is very simple. The tax lawseems to treat
debt-financed investments more favorably. Therefore, to thedegree that a
project can be financed with debt it becomes more attractive. Investments in
structures should be much more easily financed with debt than investmentsin
equipment. Structures are easily used as collateral for a loan, there isa
dense secondary market for most types of buildings wherea creditor can go if
the collateral must be liquidated, and the market value ofa building used as
collateral is normally much more predictable than the values ofmany other
assets. A firm should therefore be able to obtain a much larger loanon a
building than on many other assets without imposing any effective default risk
on the lender.11
The difficulty with examining the implications of the tax incentiveto
use debt is that there is no consensus in the literature concerning the
determinants of corporate debt-equity ratios. Most of this section willfocus
on what we will call the traditional model of debt-equity decisions,though we
will explore at the end the implications of some alternative models.
In this traditional model, corporations have at the margina tax
incentive to favor debt finance. Income accruing within acorporation is
taxed at a higher rate than income accruing directly to shareholders.
Corporate income is taxable both under the corporate tax and again, either as
dividends or as capital gains, under the shareholders' personal incometax,—22—
while income accruing directly to shareholders is taxable only under the
personal tax. This difference in tax rates creates an opportunity for tax
arbitrage. A firm and its shareholders can shift taxable income from the
firm to the shareholders simply by having the firm borrow from the
shareholders, using the proceeds to repurchase equity from the shareholders.
The direct effect of this transaction is to lower the taxable income of the
corporation by the amount of the interest payments made on the debt, and
increase the individuals' taxable income by this amount less the change in
income from equity.
In spite of this tax incentive to use debt finance, firms do not use
debt exclusively because the possibility of bankruptcy leads to conflicts of
interest between debt and equity holders, with associated real costs.12 These
real costs could take the form of direct legal and administrative costs in
bankruptcy, monitoring costs of lenders as they try to protect themselves, and
agency costs created by the incentive on the firm to change its behavior to
aid equity holders at the expense of bond holders.13
In deriving an explicit expression for the size of the tax incentive to
use debt, it is important to take account of the degree to which the income
which shareholders receive from equity takes the form of dividends rather than
capital gains. While there is no convincing explanation for why firms pay
dividends, we presume that shareholders prefer to have at least some of the
return from equity take the form of dividends, perhaps for liquidity reasons
or perhaps because of the signal conveyed about the solvency of the firm. Our
approach to dividends is very similar to that of Poterba and Summers (1985).
Except for the changes described above, we continue to follow the—23—
approach developed by Hall and Jorgenson (1967). When will an investment just
break even? Assume that the value of the marginal product of the investment
equals p and that the asset depreciates exponentially at a rate ô. The
construction cost of the project is q. However, the out-of-pocket cost of the
project to the firm is only q(1-k-uz), where k is the investment tax credit
rate, u is the corporate tax rate, and z represents the present value of the
depreciation deductions allowed under the tax law. We assume that the firm
finances this amount by borrowing bq(1—k—uz), raising the rest of the funds
from equity holders. Let i represent the nominal coupon rate on this debt,
and let ir represent the inflation rate. By using debt, the firm incurs some
real costs due to the possibility of bankruptcy. Denote these real costs by
C(b). We assume that C(O) =0,that C' >0,and that these costs are
deductible from taxable corporate income. Then the after-corporate-tax real
return, R, to equity holders from this project, net of depreciation, will
equal R =[p—C(b))(1—u)—(1—k—uz){ô+b[i(1-u)-irj}.
This real return is taxable under the personal income tax as either
dividends or capital gains. Assume that a fraction p of this return is paid
out as dividends, and that the personal tax rate on dividends is m, while
that on accruing capital gains is c. The effective tax rate, e, on the real
return therefore equals e =pm+(1-p)c.14Not only is the real return
taxable, however, but the inflationary increase in nominal value is also
taxable. We assume that this inflationary capital gain is taxable only at the
capital gains tax rate. Shareholders therefore receive a net of personal tax
return from this investment equal to R(1-e) -cir(1—b)(1-k-uz).They receive
this return on an initial investment of (1-b)(1-k-uz). Had they invested-24-
these funds in bonds instead, they could have received a net of tax return per
dollar invested of i(1-m) -it.However, due to the illiqu-idity of income
received as capital gains rather than as coupon payments or dividends, they
would require that their return on an investment in equity be higher by an
amount 0(p), where we assume that 0(1) =0and 0' < 0.
Given these assumptions, shareholders are just indifferent between
investing in bonds or investing in this corporate project if
(3.1) R(1—e) —cir(1—b)(1—k—uz)=(1—b)(1—k—uz)[i(1—rn)—it + 0]
This equation implicitly determines not only the required rate of return,
p, on an investment project, but also the firm's optimal dividend payout rate,
and optimal debt-value ratio, b*. The firm would set b and p so as to
minimize the required that it must earn on capital. Simple algebra shows
that the first-order conditions for the optimal b* and p* imply
(3.2) C'(b*) =(1—k-uz)/(].—u)(1-e){i[u+ e(1-u) —m]
-p(m—c)ir+ D}
(3.3) -D'(p*) =(rn-c)[1(1-rn) —ir(1-c) +D]/(1-e)
Equation (3.2) shows that the debt-equity ratio would be increased until the
rise in bankruptcy costs from extra debt just equals the extra tax savings
from further use of debt plus the gain from the greater liquidity of income
from debt. Similarly, equation (3.3) shows that the dividend payout rate
would be increased to the point where the tax loss from paying more dividends
just equals the gain to the individual from the extra liquidity.
Giventhesevalues for b* and p*, equation (3.1) then implies that—25—
(3.4) p =C+q(1-k-uz)
{(1_b*){i(1_m) —ir(1—c)+D]+(1_e)(o÷b*li(1_u)—ir]}/[(1—u)(1—e)J
This equation corresponds to the expression for the user cost of capital in
Hall and Jorgenson (1967), corrected for the effects of corporate financial
decisions and personal taxes.
As long as the expression in braces -in equation (3.4) is the same for
all projects, conditional on the value of 5,theseextra complications make
little difference. The numerical value of this expression -is difficult to
estimate, even without the complications added here, so that past authors have
chosen some arbitrary value for the expression as a whole rather than make an
attempt to estimate each parameter.15 However, to the extent that the optimal
values of b* or p* differ by project, these differences ought to be taken -into
account when comparing the effects of the corporate tax on different types of
investments.
There is every reason to expect the optimal value of b* to vary by type
of capital, for the reasons described above. It should also vary by industry,
if only because the variability of the profits of a firm vary systematically
by industry. Certainly the observed debt—value ratios differ substantially
by industry. According to the figures reported in Fullerton and Gordon (1983)
for the debt-value ratio in a select group of industries in 1973, the observed
ratios ranged from 0.08 -in construction to 0.787 -in real estate. The
average in the economy was 0.399.16
Unfortunately, there are no good data on the differing degrees to which
debt -is used to finance different types of capital within an industry.—26—
Auerbach (1985) attempted to explain differences in the debt-valueratios of
different firms in part by differences in their use of structuresvs.
equipment and found no sytemat-ic relation --coefficientestimates differed
wildly across specifications. However, the use of structures vs.equipment
by industry can easily be correlated with other omitted factors which differ
by industry and affect desired debt—value ratios, Given the lack ofany good
evidence on differences in the use of debt to finance differenttypes of
capital, the modest objective of this section is to demonstrate theimportance
of plausible differences in debt-value ratios for differentprojects to
calculated effective tax rates for these different projects.
Effective Tax Rates
The effective tax rate, T, on a project, as Auerbach(1983) defines it,
would satisfy the equation
(3.5) c -C-(1-b)D(1--k-uz)=q[(i(1-m)-ir)/(1--r)+ 5]
where q respresents the value in equilibrium of a unit ofcorporate capital.
In our context c is the value of the marginal product, sincea new investment
generates incentive and agency costs due to the tax-induced incentive to favor
debt and avoid dividends. Here -r =0only if the value of the marginal return
to new capital, net of depreciation, equals the individual'smarginal time
preference rate.
To indicate the potential importance of differences in debt-valueratios
between assets, assume that we have calculated various effectivetax rates
assuming no differences -in the use of debt finance. If, for example, the—27—
value of b for structures in fact exceeds that for equipment by 0.4, what
effect does this have on the estimated tax rate? If
T0isthe previously
estimated effective tax rate on structures and
T1-isthe revised estimate,






In evaluating this expression, we attempt to follow the parameter
assumptions made in Auerbach (1983) wherever possible. In particular, we
assume that the initial estimate of the effective tax rate on structures is
0.421, as Auerbach calculated for 1982, that u =.46and k =0by
statute,17 that 1(1-rn) =it + 0.04,again as in Auerbach,18 that p =0.4,and
that i equals the AAA corporate bond yield in 1982 of 0.138. We approximated
z by 0.5.19 For the personal tax rates m and c, we initially set m =0.35and
c =0.05.
Choosing a value for 0 is more arbitrary. However, equation (3.3)
gives an equilibrium condition for 0', so if we assume a functional form for
D we can calculate its value. We therefore assumed that 0(p) =a(1-p),for
some value a, implying that 0(p) =-(1-p)D',with D' given by equation
(4.3). This specification implies that in equilibrium the optimal dividend
payout rate for any given firm is indeterminate, though the average payout
rate for all firms together may be explicitly determ-ined. We note below how
our estimates change if we instead assume that 0(p) =a(1-p)2,which leads to
a unique optimal payout rate for each firm.'-28-
Given these parameter values, the new estimate of the effective tax rate
on structures drops dramatically from 0.421 to 0.193. In contrast, the
estimated effective tax rate on equipment reported by Auerbach for 1982 was
0.084. At least with these parameter values, the difference becomes minor.
Given these parameter values, the calculated value of 0 equalled 0.0118,
implying that a rather modest value of liquidity -is sufficient to offset the
tax disadvantage to dividends.
The key parameters in this calculation are the estimate of the difference
in the value of b between equipment and structures, the estimates of m
and c, and the value of the real after—tax interest rate. If, for example,
the debt-value ratio for structures exceeds the value for equipment by only
0.3, then the effective tax rate on structures drops to only 0.265.
Similarly, let us maintain our previous assumption about the difference
-in the debt-value ratios, but now consider two alternative assumptions about
the values of in and c. First, assume that in= 0.46and c =0.20With these
values, the tax advantage to using debt is much reduced, since capital gains
from equity are untaxed while interest income -is taxed more heavily under the
personal tax. Under these assumptions, the effective tax rate on structures
drops to only 0.285. However, -if we make the alternative assumption that
in= .225,following the results in Gordon and Malkiel (1981), and set c =.05,
then the effective tax rate on structures drops to 0.076.
Let us now return to our initial assumptions that the difference in the
debt-value ratio used in funding structures and equipment is 0.4, and
continue to assume that m =0.35and that c =0.05,but assume that the real
after—tax interest rate is only 0.03, changing the estimate of the inflation-29--
rate accordingly. With these assumptions, the effective tax rate on
structures drops to 0.071.
Finally, if we again maintain our initial assumptions, but assume that
the functional form for 0 is 0(p) =a(1—p)2,implying a smaller value for
0 in equilibrium, then the effective tax rate on structures drops to only
0.232.
Therefore, at least using the traditional model of corporate financial
decisions, differences in the optimal debt-value ratio for different types of
capital can make a substantial difference when calculating effective tax
rates. For most of the cases explored, the remaining difference in the
effective tax rates on equipment and structures is minor, and can be of either
sign.
This traditional model of corporate financial decisions is far from the
only one discussed seriously in the finance literature. For example, the
papers by Miller (1977) and by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) each argue, on
different grounds, that firms may have increased their use of debt until the
point where the tax advantage of using debt is eliminated. Miller considers
the effect of the increased personal interest income on the marginal personal
tax rate, while DeAngelo and Masulis consider the drop in corporate taxable
income due to interest deductions on the marginal corporate tax rate. Under
either model, differences in debt-value ratios by project have no impact on
the effective tax rates on different projects. Each of these arguments
depends critically on the marginal corporate or personal tax rate evolving
enough before the debt-value ratio becomes so high as to lead to non-negligible
agency or bankruptcy costs.-30--
A quite different model of corporate financial policy was developed
recently in Myers and Majluf (forthcoming). They argue that when market
investors see a firm issue new equity or new risky bonds, they will infer from
this that the firm's managers likely view the current prices of equity or
bonds as too high and are trying to take advantage of it. As a result, market
prices fall when new securities are issued, and managers must take this into
account when considering going to the market for new funds. They argue, as a
result, that the firm will prefer to use internal sources of funds, and will
require a higher rate of return on a new project if it must raise the funds by
issuing risky securities to outside investors.
Their argument does not consider the implications of the tax incentive
to use debt finance. As long as bonds issued by the corporation remain
riskiess, then this favorable tax treatment would make debt finance cheaper
than internal finance. If new debt issues are risky, then there -is a tradeoff
between the tax advantage of new debt issues and the disadvantage of outside
finance on which their model focuses. But the ability to finance a project
with riskless bonds will vary by project, since projects differ in their
suitability as collateral for a loan.If, as we argued above, structures make
good collateral and can be financed heavily with debt before that debt becomes
risky, then the required rate of return for structures should normally be
lower than that for other projects, even ignoring tax effects, and would be
lowered further by the tax advantage to debt finance. In this context,
however, a simple comparison of effective tax rates is no longer sufficient to
judge the effect of the tax law on the efficiency of the composition of the
capital stock, since capital may be allocated inefficiently even without tax-31—
distortions.
The analysis in this section suggests that effective tax rate calcula-
tions are extremely sensitive to assumptions about marginaldebt-equity
ratios. To the extent that different types of capital assets havedifferent
abilities to carry debt, this means that standard calculations whichassume
constant (often zero) marginal debt-equity ratios are likely to bemisleading.
The vast disparities in debt-equity ratios across industriessuggest that the
error introduced by ignoring variations in the leveragability of assets is
probably large. These results also help to resolve the empirical puzzle
raised at the beginning of the paper. Commercial buildings,especially office
buildings, can probably carry much more debt than other more specialized
structures. They may therefore be burdened much less by taxes thanconven-
tional analyses suggest.
IV. TAXATION AND TENURE CHOICE
It is widely believed that the tax system favors owner occupiedhousing.
This conclusion is repeated in many textbooks and forms the basis fora
significant amount of research on the effects of taxation on tenure choice.
The standard argument is straightforward. The services ofowner occupied
housing are untaxed while rental payments are treated as taxable income.
While landlords are permitted tax deductions which are notpermitted to
homeowners, as long as there is some positive effective tax rate on rental
income, home ownership is nonetheless thought to be tax favored. As a number
of authors including Litzenberger and Sosin (1977), Titman(1982), and—32—
Hendershott (1986) have recognized there is an important defect in thisargu-
ment. It ignores the possibility of tax arbitrage between high bracket
landlords and low bracket tenants. High bracket tax payers have a comparative
advantage over low bracket taxpayers in making use of interest deductions
which they can exploit by borrowing in order to buy real estate whichthey
then rent to low bracket tax payers.
When this effect is recognized, it turns out that homeownership is tax
favored for only a very small number of taxpayers. In this section we
demonstrate this conclusion by considering the effects of homeownership ina
setting where people would be indifferent between owning and renting their
homes but for tax incentives. In reality of course, other considerations such
as transaction costs, desire to own one's own place of residence, and the
differing incentive effects of rental and ownership contracts influence tenure
choice. But in order to study the incentives provided by the taxsystem, we
abstract from these effects.
Before turning to a calculation of the tax incentive for different
households to own their own home, it is useful to begin by illustrating the
potential tax advantage of tenancy. The user cost of owner occupied housing
for a taxpayer in thet percent tax bracket is:
(4.1) c0 =(1—t)(i+pt)
-71 + m+5
where c0 represents the user cost, i is the nominal interest rate,Pt is the
property tax rate, it is the inflation rate, m represents maintenance costs
expressed as a fraction of house value, and 5 is the sum of the depreciation
rate and risk premium.—33—
Calculation of the cost of rental housing is more complex. We assume
that competition forces rents down to the point where landlords earn the same
risk adjusted return on rental property as they could on bonds. This
assumption is warranted as long as landlords can at the margin borrow or lend.
It will become apparent that top bracket landlords will be able to charge the
lowest rents and so represent the marginal supplier of rental housing. The
breakeven condition for top bracket landlords requires that:
(4.2) R [(1_t*)i_1T+5j(1_t*z)+ Pt + m
where t is the top bracket tax rate, and z represents the present value of
depreciation allowances permitted for tax purposes.21 It follows that
taxpayers will prefer to rent rather than own their homes as long as c0 > R,
which occurs as long as the following condition is satisfied:
(4 3) t < t*Zi + [(1r--ö)t*(1_z)/(1_t*)]
p (i+pt)
Inspecting (4.3), it is clear that, assuming real after—tax interest
rates to be positive, the breakeven tax rate at which investors are just
indifferent to owning their homes is an increasing function of z and of the
top tax rate t*.It is also an increasing function of the rate of inflation
assuming that the real interest rate remains constant. This is because
increases in nominal interest raise the advantage to structuring transactions
so as to allocate interest deductions to high bracket taxpayers. These con-
siderations suggest the effects of the 1981 Tax Reform on tenure choice cannot
be evaluated on an a priori basis. On theonehand, the introduction of ACRS
tends to promote rental housing, while the reduction in the top tax rate from--34-
70 to 50 percent tends to reduce the incentives for rental housing. We there-
fore turn to a quantitative calculation of the breakeven tax rate under alter-
native tax regimes.
Under ACRS, residential property was permitted 1759 declining balance
depreciation over a useful life of 15 years (now 19 years). In addition,
residential property has the desirable feature that upon sale accelerated
depreciation is recaptured at ordinary income rates only to the extent that it
has exceeded straight-line depreciation. The 1981 Act also permits purchasers
of used assets to use the 1759 declining balance depreciation method. Prior
to 1981, asset lives were substantially longer but investors in new residen-
tial structures were allowed 2OO? declining balance (or sum-of-the-years-
digits) depreciation. Purchasers of used assets were required to use 125
declining balance depreciation, thereby lowering the prices of used structures
relative to new structures, and reducing the value of tax churning. High
individual marginal tax rates provided ample incentive for investment in ren-
tal housing, however. The Appendix describes the method used to determine the
value of depreciation allowances with churning under pre-ACRS tax rules.
Table 6 presents values of marginal tax rates for individuals who were
indifferent between homeownership and renting for the years 1965-1985. To
solve equation 4.3, we follow DeLeeuw and Ozanne (1979) in assuming that
6=0.014 and P=O.O2. In performing the user cost calculations (3.1), we add a
0.04 premium to 6 in order to adjust the cost of asset depreciation for risk.
Individuals' expectations of future inflation are represented by a distributed
lag on past inflation, and the before-tax interest rate is the historical Baa
corporate bond rate. In each year owners of residential rental property are—35—
assumed to optimize over the choice of depreciation method and potential
churning period.22
The results in Table 6 describe four scenarios. We examine cases in
which individuals who own rental housing avoid half their capital gains
liability at the margin and also cases in which they pay the full statutory
rate on capital gains. In addition, we report separately specifications in
which investors treat depreciation allowances as risky (and so add 0.04 to the
annual discount rate in calculating their present value) and in which they are
viewed as riskiess.
The striking implication of the findings reported in Table 6 is that home
ownership has not until recently been favored by the tax code.23 High
individual tax rates before 1982 encouraged most taxpayers to rent their
dwellings from top—rate individuals. While the results in Table 6 reflect
changing inflation and interest rates as well as statutory tax changes, it is
hard to escape from the conclusion that falling personal taxes have undone
changes in the depreciation provisions to make home ownership much more
attractive in recent years. From this perspective, -it is perhaps not
surprising that home ownership and residential investment have been strong in
recent years.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis 'in this paper highlights the difficulty of predicting the
effects of tax rules on the level and composition of investment. The
incentives for investment provided by the tax law turn out to depend on a-36--
number of quite specific features of the law, rather thanjust on tax rates
and depreciation schedules. They also depend on how thetax law interacts
with the liquidity characteristics of differenttypes of assets. Analyses
which omit these factors are likely to have littlepredictive power for the
effects of tax changes on the composition of investment. Andnormative
conclusions based on models which omit them are likely to bevery misleading.
Ourfindingsimply that there are at most minimal allocative losses
resulting from the differential treatment of equipment and structures under
current depreciation schedules. There are substantial reasons to believethat
residential and non—residential real estate investments madeby partnerships
are substantially favored under current law, because of the taxadvantages
associated with churning assets, arbitrage betweentaxpayers in different
brackets, and leverage. Movements to equalize effective tax rateson
structures and equipment investments as these rates arenormally measured
would be likely to exacerbate these distortions. Changes in thetax rules
governing recapture, limited partnerships and the use of non—recourse debt have
the potential to reduce the tax benefits accruing to investments inrental
properties and commercial buildings. Alternatively the possible tax bias in
favor of these assets could be mitigated by providing them withdepreciation
schedules different than those afforded other structures investments.
The conclusion that the tax system discriminatesstrongly in favor of
rental housing and against owner occupied housing raises important issuesfor
subsequent research. Given tax incentives, some other explanation must be
given for the predominance of home ownership. A natural candidate is the
moral hzard problem associated with rental contracts. Tenants have little-37-
incentive to care for properties which they do not own. Landlords have strong
incentives to deny tenants the right to alter properties in ways that tenants
may prefer but which may ultimate reduce market value. These problems are
solved when people rent fromthemselvesas with owner occupied housing. In
the presence of moral hazard problems, the market is unlikely to attain an
optimal solution even in the absence of taxes. The imposition of taxes which
discourage home ownership may result in very substantial deadweight losses
given the presence of pre—exist-ing distortions.
A similar point applies to the question of debt financed investments in
structures. To the extent that there are important information problems
bearing on types of capital which are not liquid, too little investment in
these types of capital is likely to take place even in the absence of taxes.
These biases may be exacerbated by tax rules which favor liquid investments.
If so, the social costs of non-neutral taxation may be much greater than the
loses associated with distortionary taxation in environments without
pre—existing distortions. Consideration of structures investments highlights
the need for the development of models considering the effects of taxes in
markets already distorted by information problems. It seems likely that the
welfare consequences of the interaction of tax rules and information problems
are likely to be far greater than those found in typical neutrality
calculations. We plan to pursue these issues in future research.-38--
APPENDIX:
Calculation of Depreciation Allowances With Churning
This appendix describes the solution method used to evaluate the present
value of depreciation allowances when firms or individuals churn 'their assets.
The procedure is slightly more complicated than standard present-value calcula-
tions because the value of future tax benefits is a function of the prices of
used assets, which are functions of those tax benefits, and so on. Consistency
requires that anticipated prices of used assets take churning possibilities into
account.
These calculations assume that investors expect inflation rates, interest
rates, and the tax law not to change in the future. In addition, our results
employ the assumption that assets depreciate at constant exponential rates.
These assumptions are standard in the effective tax rate literature when com-
puting the value of depreciation allowances. Hendershott and Ling (1984)
assume a different, reverse—sum--of--the-years depreciation schedule, which per—
mits a direct numerical evaluation of churning benefits. Assets which depre—
ciate exponentially have no terminal dates, thus making -it impossible to use
the solution technique Hendershott and Ling describe to evaluate churning of
these assets. Pellechio (1985) employs a solution method which can accomodate
exponential depreciation but is different from the one used here.
Equations 2.2 -2.6in the text describe the value of depreciation allowan-
ces when firms churn their assets after k years. These equations include terms
for Q(k), the market price of a used asset k years after its initial purchase
(the price of new capital in the first year -is normalized to one). Under the-39—
assumption that the tax treatment of old assets is the same as that accorded new
assets, Q(k) is as given in 23:
(A.1) Q(k) =
Unfortunately,this assumption of symmetric treatment of old and new assets
is valid only under ACRS. Before the introduction of ACRS, used nonresidential
structures had to be depreciated straight-line. Pre—ACRS residential structures
were depreciated at declining balance rates of 2OO when new and 125 when used.
These features make old assets less valuable than (A.1) indicates. Of course,
these rules do not change the relative prices of used assets of different ages,
since their tax treatment if sold is identical; -it will, for example, always be
the case that
(A.2) Q(k+ri) =[(1_6)(171)]flQ(k)
In calculating the present value of depreciation allowances, we used (A.2)
and prevailing depreciation rules to solve numerically for the optimal treatment
of used assets. Denote by Zju the present value of depreciation allowances for
an investor in asset I when it -is used. If represents the present value of
depreciation allowances for a new asset, then it will be the case that:
(A.3) Q(k) =[(16)(1)]k(l-TZ.)/(1-Tz.)
Given the depreciation and recapture rules of equations 2.2 -2.6,the
maximized present value of depreciation benefits for a new asset which the
investor plans to sell in year k will be:-40--
(A.4) Zth =ak+
where aik and ik depend on tax rules, inflation, depreciation rates, and
other parameters. Substituting (A.3) into (A.4) produces
(A.5) z. ={a.k+ ik 1-oj)(1+ir)]J / {i + kThill -TZ.}
The optimal churning program maximizes the value of in (A.5), and we use
that value of zth for the calculations in the tables.-41-
Footnotes
1.Hendershott and Ling (1984) and Pellechio (1985) have examined the
incentives for churning assets. Our treatment generalizes their work by
allowing for the important possibility that effective capital gains rates are
below statutory rates. This accounts for our more positive view of churning
as a device for reducing tax liabilities.
2. Limitations on loss carry-forewards may induce some small number of firms
in special circumstances to choose the longer depreciation lives and the
associated straight-line method. See Auerbach and Poterba (1986).
3.We do not consider the churning of equipment; however, in general it is
never desirable to churn equipment for tax reasons alone. The investment tax
credit (ITC) consitutes a substantial part of cost recovery for equipment
investment, and the tax law includes harsh recapture provisions for the ITC
upon early sale of equipment. Since used equipment is ineligible for the ITC,
the combined effect is to make asset sales unattractive from a tax standpoint.
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) find that not even equipment put into place
before the introduction of ACRS could be profitably churned after 1981.
4.The formula actually requires a minor correction for discounting of
depreciation allowances within each year and the mid-month convention; the
calculations in the tables embody these subtleties.
5.Tax changes in 1984 required that investors pay recapture taxes imme-
diately upon sale of an asset, even if the buyer pays in installments. As
Gilson, Scholes, and Wolfson (1986) illustrate, however, an installment sale
can still significantly reduce the seller's effective capital gains tax rate.—42—
6. Recent law changes have limited but by no means eliminated investors
abilities to use these strategies.
7.We are agnostic on the question of whether sophisticated real estate
investors are more likely than other investors to underreport their gains. it
may be particularly difficult to avoid declaring capital gains on anasset for
which a taxpayer has received depreciation allowances for years.
8. Note that the incentive to chrun is strongest at low inflation rates.
Under current recapture rules, churning serves less to undo the effects of
inflation than it does to exploit the difference between economic depreciation
and tax depreciation.
9.These fractions of depreciation taken using accleration are substantially
lower than fractions Wales (1966) reports for most industries in 1960.
Running his learning functions foreward to 1982 predicts rates of use of acce-
lerated depreciation even more at variance with firms' practices, despite
changes which have made accelerated depreciation more generous than before.
10. For a recent example, see Auerbach (1983).
11. Buildings are not unique in this regard. Our argument applies as well
to any asset where there is a good secondary market and a relatively stable
price. Other examples might include motor vehicles, airplanes, or main-frame
computers. Most types of equipment, however, tend to be specialized to the
activities of a particular firm, so have little value to a creditor if they
are seized in lieu of repayment of the debt. Conversely, not all types of
buildings are equally liquid or have an equally stable value. Office
buildings, for example, are probably far more liquid than factory buildings.
12. For a recent exposition of this view, see Modigliani (1982) or Gordon—43—
(1982).
13. For an exposition on these points, see Gordon and Malkiel (1981),Myers
(1977), Jensen and Meckling (1976), or White (1983).
14. In this section c refers to the effective capital gains tax rateon
accruinQ gains rather than on realized gains as in the last section.
15. Hall and Jorgenson (1967) set this expression equal to S +0.1.Auerbach
(1983), while also deriving a related formula involving the effects of debt
finance, set the resulting espress-lon equal to 5+ 0.4.
16. These figures represent the average use of debt for all the capital in
thefirm, and not necessarily the marginal debt-value ratio. However, there
is no systematic reason in the above model why the desired value of b*ought
to change as a firm expands.
17. We ignore here the possibility that the firm may have taxable losses that
cannot be carried back to previous tax years or at least carried forward and
used up quickly. For further discussion, see Auerbach (1983) and Auerbachand
Poterba (1986).
18. Bradford and Fullerton (1981) demonstrated the sensitivity of estimated
tax rates to this estimate of the individual's opportunity cost of funds.By
following Auerbach (1983) in assuming such a high after-tax real interest
rate, we reduce the effects of debt finance on the estimated effective tax
rate.
19. See Summers (1986) for a discussion of the discounting of depreciation
allowances.
20. In order to keep the real after-tax interest rate at 0.04, weadjust the
estimate for the inflation rate as needed.—44-
21.In deriving (4.2), we follow Bulow and Summers (1984) in assuming that
the tax system does not share -in the risks associated with owning structures.
22. Calculations for the pre—ACRS period ignore potential complications
involving interactions of depreciation allowances and the maximum tax on
earned income, as described by Hite and Sanders (1981). For our purposes it
is enough to assume that for marginal investors the bulk of their income is
unearned. In addition, these calculations ignore the cost of land and the
capital gains tax liability that may be generated when a residence is churned
and land is sold. We assume implicitly that owner-occupiers and renters rent
the land for their residences at equal rates.
23. These results differ substantially from more standard calculations of
authors such as Diamond (1980) and Hendershott and Shilling (1982) that find
homeownership to have become progressively more attractive over the 1970s.
Our model incorporates tax arbitrage, and also differs from theirs -in assuming
that investors expect house prices to be in equilibrium, and therefore rising
at the general rate of inflation.—45-
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Note: Figures in the table refer to current dollar net capital stocks.
Numbers in parentheses are percentages of row totals. It is assumed
that all corporate residential structures are rental properties.









Source: unpublished data, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Commerce.
U.S. Department of
Table 2: Structures Investment in 1980 and 1985







































Required Rate of Return =0.02
3% 0.69 0.81 0.71 0.59
(37%) (26%) (36%) (44%)
6% 0.58 0.60 0.48 0.36
(44%) (43%) (50%) (55%)
10% 0.47 0.41 0.33 0.24
(50%) (53%) (58%) (59%)
Required Rate of Return =0.04
3% 0.61 0.62 0.55 0.48
(35%) (35%) (38%) (42%)
6% 0.58 0.47 0.40 0.36
(37%) (42%) (45%) (47%)
10% 0.43 0.38 0.33 0.27
(44%) (46%) (48%) (50%)
Note: Top entry is the present value of depreciation benefits; bottom entry








Required Rate of Return =0.02
3% 0.69 1.06 0.90 0.75
(41%) (-14%) (18%) (35%)
6% 0.58 0.85 0.68 0.53
(48%) (26%) (42%) (51%)
10% 0.47 0.69 0.48 0.36
(54%) (41%) (54%) (59%)
Required Rate of Return =0.D4
3% 0.61 0.75 0.66 0.57
(38%) (29%) (35%) (41%)
6% 0.52 0.61 0.52 0.43
(44%) (39%) (44%) (48%)
10% 0.43 0.50 0.41 0.34
(48% (45%) (49%) (51%)
Note: Top entry is the present value of depreciation benefits; bottom entry
in parentheses is the corresponding effective tax rate.Table 5: Choice of Depreciation Method under ACRS
(Millions of Current Dollars)
Corporat -ions
1981 1982
Total allocable 15-year real property
other than low—income housing and
public utility property 24,836 25,276
Accelerated depreciation 15,474 16,923
() (62.3) (67.0)
Straight-line
Unallocable property, foreign property,
and tax exempt organizations 6,171 5,294
Partnerships
1981 1982
Total allocable 15-year real property
other than low-income housing and
public utility property 29,044 46,553




Unallocable property, foreign property,
and tax exempt organizations 1,879 1,492
Note: Entries correspond to dollar values of 15-year real property (other than
low—income housing and public utility structures) put in place and depreciated
by the indicated method in these years. Unallocable property could not reliably
be assigned to either the accelerated or straight-line depreciation category.
These data exclude investments for which the IRS was unable to determine from
the tax form which type of capital was being depreciated.
Source: unpublished preliminary data, Statistics of Income Division, Internal














1965 70 0 64 0 70+
1970 73 24 62 27 69
1975 70 59 59 59 59
1980 70 55 63 56 64
1981 69 53 56 53 56
1982 50 32 50+ 41 50+
1983 50 28 50 38 50+
1984 50 19 34 37 44
1985 50 11 23 13 29
Note: Entries correspond to breakeven tax rates for tenure choice. Taxpayers
with lower marginal tax rates will be renters, and those with higher
marginal rates will be owner-occupiers.